Maheu et al. c. R. – TCC: Weekly Payments by Former Spouse Not “Support Amount[s]”

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Maheu et al. v. The Queen[1] (September 25, 2013) involved the treatment of payments made between former spouses:

[1]             These are appeals, under the informal procedure, from the reassessments made by the Minister of National Revenue (the Minister) under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. (1985) c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (the Act), in respect of the appellant’s 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 taxation years.

[2]             Martial Beauregard was joined to Guylaine Maheu’s appeals following an order by the Tax Court of Canada under paragraph 174(3)(b) of the Act dated March 15, 2013, for the 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 taxation years. The issues regarding which a decision was requested by the respondent are as follows:

[Translation]

(a)  Must Guylaine Maheu include in computing her income for the 2007 to 2010 taxation years the following amounts received from Martial Beauregard as support during each of these taxation years:

2007

2008

2009

2010

$16,000

$52,000

$52,000

$52,000


(b) Could Martial Beauregard deduct in computing his income for the 2007 to 2010 taxation years the following amounts paid to Guylaine Maheu as support during each of the these taxation years?

2007

2008

2009

2010

$16,000

$52,000

$52,000

$52,000


[3]             The facts relevant to this case are as follows:

(a)   Guylaine Maheu and Martial Beauregard were married on August 25, 1984, under the partnership of acquests regime and separated on December 30, 2006;

(b)   On February 21, 2007, Guylaine Maheu and Martial Beauregard signed a document entitled the [Translation] “agreement for corollary relief” (the Agreement), which was ratified by the Quebec Superior Court on February 28, 2007, in the judgement of divorce.

(c)   The Agreement deals, among other things, with (i) the custody of and access rights to the couple’s youngest child, (ii) the parent having as a dependant the couple’s eldest child, (iii) the lack of child support to take care of the needs of the couple’s children and (iv) the partition of the family patrimony, the matrimonial regime and their financial interests, generally done equally.

(d)   The Agreement also contains a section entitled [Translation] “support for the female petitioner”, which includes the following two paragraphs:

         [Translation]

         66.    In consideration of the value of the companies of which the male petitioner is a shareholder and which the parties admit knowing exactly and having been informed of by their accountant, Bernard Gagné, the parties agree that the male petitioner will pay to the female petitioner, starting from the date of the judgment of divorce to be handed down and for the four years following the date of the judgment of divorce, a net sum of $1,000.00 per week, thus representing, over the four years, the amount of $208,000.00.

         67.    On that date, each party will irrevocably waive the right to claim from the other party any support for the present, past or future;

The former husband initially did not attempt to deduct the payments but then appears to have had a change of heart:

(e)   Martial Beauregard did not initially claim a deduction for support in his tax returns for the 2007 to 2009 taxation years;

(f)    Guylaine Maheu did not include any amounts in her tax returns filed for the 2007 to 2009 taxation years as support that she has or has allegedly received from Martial Beauregard for her benefit during those taxation years;

(g)   In his tax return for the 2010 taxation year, Martial Beauregard claimed a deduction of $52,000 as support that he has or has allegedly paid to Guylaine Maheu for her benefit during that taxation year;

(h)   On April 29, 2011, Martial Beauregard requested an adjustment to his tax returns for each of the taxation years from 2007 to 2009 in order to claim a deduction for support paid to Guylaine Maheu for her benefit during those taxation years.

(i)    On September 15, 2011, the Minister made reassessments in respect of Martial Beauregard for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 taxation years following up on the request to adjust his tax returns and thus granting him the following deductions for support paid to Guylaine Maheu for her benefit during these taxation years;

2007

2008

2009

$16,000

$52,000

$52,000



The Minister similarly assessed the former wife for receipt of these amounts, opening up her 2007 taxation year on the basis that “she had made a misrepresentation that was attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default given that the appellant knew or ought to have known that the amounts received as support were taxable” [para. [4]].

The appellant former wife claimed that the payments were a division of family property and never intended as spousal support:

[7]             The appellant also explained that the partition of the family patrimony and the matrimonial regime was done equally between the parties and that the amounts owed to the appellant by her former spouse from the partition of the family patrimony and the matrimonial regime were paid to the appellant in weekly instalments of $1,000 since the granting of divorce. The appellant filed as Exhibit A-1 a request for the authorization to enter alone into an act for which the consent of the other spouse would be required, which was filed with the Superior Court of Québec on June 23, 2008, by the appellant’s former spouse, article 12 of which reads as follows:

[Translation]

12. The amounts owed by the male petitioner to the female petitioner for the partition of the family patrimony and the matrimonial regime are paid to the female petitioner in weekly instalments of $1,000.00 since the granting of divorce.

The court accepted the appellant’s position as being more consistent with the facts and common sense:

[21]        Based on the evidence, the needs and the standard of living of the appellant were not discussed as part of negotiating the Agreement, and no support amount was requested by the appellant. In addition, no child support was determined for the appellant’s former spouse to maintain their children.

[22]        Regarding the parties’ conduct following the conclusion of the Agreement, I note that Martial Beauregard, an experienced businessman, waited four years before claiming the deduction of the amounts paid to the appellant and that, in the request filed with the Superior Court by the added party on June 23, 2008, it was clearly specified that the weekly payments of $1,000 were made for the partition of the family patrimony and the matrimonial regime. In other words, Martial Beauregard clearly acknowledged that the sharing of the value of the companies was done as part of the partition of the family patrimony and the matrimonial regime.

[23]        Counsel for the respondent stated that paragraph 12 of said request was badly written and was absolutely false because the adjustments flowing from the partition of the family patrimony and the matrimonial regime were clearly specified at paragraphs 60 to 65 of the Agreement. Under paragraph 62, the added party had to pay the appellant as compensation the amount of $88,044.49 and, under paragraph 64, the appellant obtained the right to take out a hypothec on the immovable located at 21 St-Jude Street in Granby to guarantee the payment of her debt.

[24]        I cannot determine with certainty whether paragraph 12 of the request was badly written or not, but it appears to be quite clear that the sharing of the value of the companies in which Martial Beauregard was a shareholder was not done as part of the payment of support and that said sharing was rather done as consideration for each party’s waiver of the right to claim support from the other party as specified at paragraph 67.

[25]        The title [Translation] “support for the female petitioner” is discordant with the content of paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Agreement because paragraph 66 does not even refer to any support and paragraph 67 applies to both parties, not just the appellant.

[26]        For these reasons, the appeals are allowed and the reassessments made in respect of the appellant are vacated.

[1] 2013 TCC 279.